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Strong as the Weakest Link:
Medical Response to a
Catastrophic Event
Eileen Salinsky, Consultant
Overview — Natural disasters and acts of terrorism have placed a spotlight on the ability of health care providers to surge in response to catastrophic
conditions. This paper reviews the status of efforts to develop the capacity
and capabilities of the health care system to respond to disasters and other
mass casualty events. Strategies for adapting routine medical practices and
protocols to the demands posed by extraordinary circumstances and scarce
resources are summarized. Existing federal roles, responsibilities, and assets
relative to the contributions of state and local government and the private
sector are described, including specific programmatic activities such as the
Strategic National Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical System, and
the Hospital Preparedness Program. Opportunities for federal policymakers seeking to strengthen and expedite preparations for medical disaster
response are highlighted.
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Strong as the Weakest Link:
Medical Response to a
Catastrophic Event
As storms, flooding, and brush fires threaten property and lives across
the country, concerns about the adequacy of disaster medical response
linger in the public consciousness. When Hurricane Katrina slammed
into the Gulf Coast in August 2005, Americans were shocked by grave
deficiencies in disaster response efforts. This tragedy—coupled with
the Minneapolis bridge collapse, the looming potential of an influenza
pandemic, catastrophic natural disasters around the globe, and the omnipresent threat of terrorism—underscore the urgency of developing more
robust and flexible capacity for responding to major medical emergencies.
While significant progress has been made in recent years, additional work
remains. Many experts have voiced concern that funding for, and commitment to, medical preparedness development are lagging. Ensuring that
progress made to date is sustained and that unresolved weaknesses are
addressed will require the renewed focus and attention of policymakers
at all levels of government.

Beyond Surge
Surge capacity—the health care system’s ability to quickly expand normal
service capacity in response to a sharp increase in demand for medical
care—is a familiar, but evolving, concept for most health care organizations. Performance expectations, as articulated by state regulations, the
Joint Commission standards, and Medicare and Medicaid Conditions of
Participation, have long required hospitals to develop and assess plans
for managing emergency situations. However, traditional “disaster plans”
have typically focused on emergency events (such as major transportation
accidents) likely to yield multiple casualties, rather than catastrophic events
resulting in mass casualties.1 In the past, these plans often focused solely
on general trauma victims and did not consider the specialty care needs
generated by biological, chemical, or radiological events. Furthermore,
hospitals have historically developed their own institution-specific plans in
isolation without considering broader community-wide capabilities. Nonhospital medical resources have rarely been challenged to consider their
role in disaster response.2 Traditional approaches to emergency preparedness seek to stretch the capacity of the existing system—not restructure
the fundamental nature and interoperability of that system.
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Health care organizations are beginning to shift their approach to disaster management in order to prepare for casualty loads measured in
thousands, rather than tens. In doing so, they must consider practices
and protocols that significantly depart from “business as usual” models.
As acknowledged in the President’s Homeland Security Directive-21 on
Public Health and Medical Preparedness,3 the structure and operating
principles of routine health care delivery are poorly suited to meet the
needs created by a catastrophic health event. The Directive calls on medical service providers to develop “an operational concept for the medical
response to catastrophic health events that is substantively distinct from
and broader than that which guides day-to-day operations.”

It is unlikely that conventional approaches
to health care delivery
could be sustained in a
catastrophic event.

This transformed vision of disaster response necessitates a redefinition
of how and by whom medical services should be delivered. Conventional
approaches to health care delivery likely could not be sustained under the
scale and severity of a major disaster or catastrophic event. Under such
circumstances, with staggering numbers of casualties and the possibility
that the health care service infrastructure would itself be compromised,
the goal becomes “graceful degradation” of service capabilities.4 In essence,

Defining Disaster Medical Response
Taxonomy for defining the magnitude of a public health emergency
and its impact on demand for medical services is not well established.
The terms “emergency” and “major disaster” have specific meanings
in the Stafford Act,* which provides authority for federal assistance
to states and communities pending a presidential declaration.
The statute provides for greater levels of assistance under a major
disaster declaration, but statutory language limits this designation
to natural catastrophes or other incidents resulting in severe physical
destruction (such as fire, floods, or explosions).
Emergency declarations provide less assistance, but the President has
broader discretion in defining the circumstances that constitute an
emergency. Statutory language does not establish clear parameters for
differentiating events based on the magnitude of medical needs.
For the purposes of this paper, the terms catastrophe, disaster, and
public health emergency are used to describe urgent events that are
likely to overwhelm a community’s entire health care system. The
intent is to distinguish the health care needs relating to these incidents
from normal fluctuations in health care demand, which can at times
overwhelm the capacity of individual provider organizations.
* Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 100-707, signed into law
November 23, 1988; amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, P.L. 93-288. This Act constitutes the
statutory authority for most federal disaster response activities especially as they pertain to Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and FEMA programs.
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health care organizations would seek to “engineer system failure” in a deliberate, rational manner in order to protect the most critical services and
optimize patient outcomes under exceptionally challenging conditions.
Effective performance during a major disaster relies on a variety of strategies that are not routinely practiced during normal operations, but require
advance planning and clear communication. Regionalized deployment of
medical assets, coordinated decision making through an incident command
system, use of alternate care sites, altered standards of care, expanded
scope of practice authorities for health care professionals, and triage-based
protocols for allocating scarce resources are examples of strategies with
significant potential to maximize the capacity and effectiveness of medical
response. These approaches can require hospitals and other health care
organizations to work with public officials—and each other—in ways that
are often radically different from their day-to-day relationships.
Developing these plans in advance of a catastrophic emergency is extremely
challenging in large part because many of these strategies have limited
utility in achieving immediate, normal objectives and may, in fact, conflict
with routine priorities. Yet because a community’s preparedness ultimately
rests on the strength of the “weakest link” in its planning chain, all parties
have an obligation to confront these difficult decisions.

contingency Planning
The uncertain nature of future emergencies further complicates planning
efforts. Different threats place different types of demands on medical
response capacity, and these contingencies must be carefully considered. Public health emergencies can take many forms,
varying in the number and acuity of casualties,
the nature of victims’ medical needs, the time
frame for impact and recovery, the degree to
which medical assets are compromised,
and the scope of the affected area. As
summarized in Figure 1, the National
Preparedness Guidelines issued
by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) have identified
15 scenarios depicting a diverse
set of high-consequence, highrisk events to help focus contingency planning.5
The manner and degree to which
medical surge response practices
would deviate from routine norms
would depend greatly on the nature, scale,
and severity of the public health emergency.
While the threats identified in the National
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Figure 1
National Planning Scenarios

Source: DHS, National Preparedness Guidelines, September 2007, p. 31;
available at www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf.
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Planning Scenarios have the potential to result in large casualty loads, it
isimportant to note that even a relatively small number of exotic, communicable disease cases can place extraordinary strains on health care organizations and seriously disrupt normal operations. As the SARS outbreak
demonstrated, novel infectious agents have the potential to cause widespread contagion and fear and can be difficult to characterize. Therefore,
treatment protocols demand scarce specialized resources (such as personal
protective equipment, patient isolation facilities, and dedicated laboratory
capabilities), as well as rigorous infection control practices to minimize
exposure and transmission risks. Intentional incidents, whether involving
bio-agents or other health threats, also raise
specific demands for the health care system
Prospective planning can be costly, both
in order to allow for successful coordination
financially and politically, as private sector
with law enforcement activities, as well as
organizations and government agencies
to address purposeful efforts to undermine
medical response capabilities.
confront difficult decisions that may arise at

some point in the future.
The short-term incentives for tackling the
diverse challenges of disaster planning are
low for both health care organizations and policy officials, and the immediate risks of addressing these concerns in advance of a disaster are
high. Prospective planning can be costly, both financially and politically,
as private sector organizations and government agencies confront difficult
decisions that may arise at some point in the future. One’s willingness to
address these questions proactively in a meaningful way is often governed
by the perceived probability of a catastrophic event actually occurring.
This perception is, in turn, influenced by prior disaster experience, the
credibility of threat assessment processes, and the level of leadership
committed to building medical response capacity.
Developing medical response capacity and capabilities to address catastrophic threats is a collective responsibility. This shared responsibility
involves both private and public sector health care organizations (such as
hospitals and nursing homes), individual health care providers (such as
physicians, nurses, and emergency medical technicians), private sector
assets outside of the health domain (such as transportation fleets, food
service vendors, and child care providers), local and state health and
emergency management agencies, and various components of the federal
government. Much of this nation’s medical services infrastructure resides
in the private sector, and state governments are primarily responsible for
coordinating and regulating private sector efforts to prepare for medical
emergencies. However, the federal government has a critical role to play
in encouraging state and local officials to pursue these objectives proactively, as well as in facilitating inter-state collaboration through funding
incentives and policy guidance.
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The Current Federal Role
Measured in terms of financial investment, the role of the federal government in developing medical disaster response capabilities is largely
focused on creating new and improved medical countermeasures against
particular public health threats, such as pandemic influenza, anthrax,
smallpox, and nuclear explosions. Relatively fewer resources have been
directed at providing financial support and technical assistance to state
governments or developing federal personnel capacity to assist in medical
response activities.
This section of the paper provides a brief overview of federally sponsored
activities to develop medical preparedness, including a synopsis of federal
assets that could be deployed in the event of a major medical disaster and
a summary of the funding programs that provide financial and technical
support to states. (More detailed descriptions of select federal disaster
medical response programs are provided in the Appendix.) The subsequent section reviews the perceived status of preparedness development
efforts by private, local, state, and federal stakeholders and identifies
concerns and tensions that have been raised by these stakeholders and
expert observers.

Response Resources
The federal role in providing direct, operational support for disaster
medical response is defined by the National Response Framework (NRF).6
The NRF assumes that state authorities will be primarily responsible
for coordinating all disaster response activities, but acknowledges that
federal assistance may be requested if state resources are exceeded or
exhausted. Federal responsibilities specific to medical response are
delineated by the Plan’s Emergency Support Function #8: Public Health
and Medical Services Annex.7
The Annex identifies the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) as the primary agency responsible for coordinating and implementing federal public health and medical assistance to states and
localities. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response (OASPR) has primary responsibility for carrying out this
function by utilizing the resources of that office, managing other HHS
assets, and coordinating with other federal agencies. These federal public
health and medical activities are nested within the broader NRF, which
incorporates a range of response functions including mass care and
housing, transportation, communications, and public works. Overall
coordination of the federal response is implemented by the DHS. Coordination is extremely important in that effective medical treatment
may depend on support provided through mass care, transportation,
and other functions.8
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Key federal assets that could be deployed to support state and local medical response include:
QQ

The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), a repository of pharmaceutical agents and medical supplies

QQ

The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a federally coordinated network of private sector medical personnel and inpatient
facilities, as well as military medical transportation resources

QQ

The Public Health Service (PHS) Commissioned Corps Rapid Deployment Teams, consisting of clinical and support staff employed
by the federal government who can be mobilized to assist in disaster
medical response

Over the last several years, HHS has taken a variety of steps to enhance
the capacity and capabilities of these response resources.
The federal government has made a significant investment in developing
and acquiring additional medical countermeasures for inclusion in the
SNS.9 The stockpile includes a variety of commonly available medications
and supplies, but substantial resources have been devoted to creating and
purchasing new and improved medical countermeasures for which commercial demand is limited. HHS has established both “push” and “pull”
incentives to spark development of the priority medical countermeasures
needed to respond to high-risk threats (Figure 2).
Push — The National Institutes of Health supports a variety of research
and development activities focused on biological, radiological, and chemical countermeasures. NIH devoted approximately $1.7 billion in fiscal
year (FY) 2008 funding to biodefense-related research focused on a range
of public health threats including traditional agents with the potential
to cause mass casualties (such as Bacillus anthracis), enhanced agents that

Figure 2
Medical Countermeasures Pipeline
ACADEMIA

Basic
Research
NIH “Push”

Pathogen
Biology
Host Response

Target
Identification

Preclinical
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Clinical
Evaluation
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Therapies Bioshield
“Pull”
Diagnostics

Strategic
National
Stockpile

INDUSTRY

Source: Adapted from Office of Public Health Disaster Medical Countermeasures, Project Bioshield, Annual Report
to Congress: July 2004 through July 2006, Office of Public Health Disaster Preparedness, HHS, July 31, 2006, p. 19;
available at www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/documents/bioshieldannualreport.pdf.
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have naturally evolved to circumvent available countermeasures (such
as multi-drug resistant plague), emerging agents (such as H5N1 avian
influenza), and advanced agents that have been artificially engineered to
be more severe or less vulnerable to traditional treatments (such as multidrug resistant B. anthracis).10 Because there is little to no current market
demand for these products, public funds are needed to seed research and
early development activities.
Pull — Dedicated federal funds have also been designated to support the
advanced development and procurement of medical countermeasures for
the SNS. These funding mechanisms assure pharmaceutical manufacturers
that a market will exist for their products to encourage private sector investment in late-stage development. The $5.6 billion Project Bioshield fund was
established in the FY 2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act and is administered by the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) within the OASPR. Approximately $1.8 billion was
drawn from this fund between July 2004 and July 2006 for the acquisition of
anthrax vaccine, anthrax therapeutics, botulinum antitoxin, and pediatric
formulations of potassium iodine.11 In addition to these Bioshield-related
procurements, substantial resources have also been devoted to enhancing
the SNS inventory in preparation for an influenza pandemic. Congress appropriated $5.6 billion in emergency supplemental FY 2006 funding to support pandemic influenza preparedness, and this funding has largely been
committed to vaccine and antitoxin stockpiles.12 (See Figure 3.)

In addition to the funding increases
for specialized product acquisition,
general funding for the SNS has also
risen in recent years. The SNS is operated by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC). The stockpile
was established at CDC in 1999. Although budgetary authority for the
program was transferred to DHS by the
Homeland Security Act of 200213 and
transferred back to HHS in 2004 by the
Project Bioshield Act,14 CDC has managed the SNS since its inception. General SNS funding is used to support the
basic management, storage, rotation,
and security of stockpile inventories
and to augment stockpile holdings for
the many types of products not covered
by specialized procurement programs
(such as psychotropic medications).
SNS funds have also been used to support the development of Federal Medical Stations (FMS), mobile facilities that

Figure 3
FY 2006 Pandemic Influenza
Supplemental Funding [$ billions]
State and Local Preparedness
[$0.60]
Medical Supplies
[$0.17]
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Total Funding — $5.59 billion
International Collaboration
[$0.18]
Other Domestic Activities
[$0.28]
Risk Communications
[$0.05]

Antivirals
[$1.08]

Vaccines
[$3.23]

Source: HHS, “Report to Congress: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Spending,”
prepared in response to request in conference report 109-359, December 2007, p. 4;
available at www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/mcm/panflu/spending.html.
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are designed to provide low- to mid-acuity hospital
bed surge capacity.
Financial investments in the workforce-based
components of federal disaster medical assistance have been less substantial than those
directed at fortifying the SNS (Figure 4), but HHS
has pursued enhancements to the NDMS and PHS
Commissioned Corps Rapid Response Teams.
In light of perceived inadequacies in the federal
response to Hurricane Katrina, the Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 15 (PAHPA)
authorized transfer of the NDMS to HHS from
DHS. This transfer was initiated in 2007, and a
comprehensive review of NDMS functionality has
been conducted by HHS, DHS, the Department of
Defense, and the Veterans Administration.16 Similarly, policies and procedures for deploying the
PHS Commissioned Corps have been reviewed,
and HHS has proposed some enhancements to the
training and management of Rapid Deployment
teams within the Corps.

Figure 4
Strategic National Stockpile and
National Disaster Medical System Funding,
FY 2004–2008 [$ millions]
Millions
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Support for State and
Local Preparedness
The operationally oriented programs described above often receive a high
level of visibility and critique, but federal officials stress that these assets
are designed to supplement state and local capabilities and are not independently sufficient to support response to a mass casualty event. Major
efforts to strengthen the ability of states and localities to mount their own
disaster medical response include the Hospital Preparedness Program
(HPP), the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program (PHEP), and
the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS).
QQ

$552

$524

$47
|

FY 2006

$47
|

FY 2007

$46
|

FY 2008
(enacted)

Source: HHS, “Budget in Brief,” 2006, 2007,
2008, and 2009; and HHS, “Justification for
Estimates for Appropriations Committees FY
2009: General Departmental Management”;
available at www.hhs.gov/budget.

HPP provides grants to states to aid hospitals and health care systems
in preparing for and responding to bioterrorism and other public
health emergencies. This program is the dominant source of federal
preparedness dollars for health care provider organizations, as states
are required to redistribute a majority of HPP funds to participating
hospitals and other clinical sites. Originally instituted in 2002 within
the Health Resources Services Administration as the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program, the program was transferred
to OASPR in 2007.17

The grant program has identified the following priority areas for FY
2008 funding: developing interoperable communications systems, tracking bed availability, registering and mobilizing health care volunteers,
managing fatalities, implementing medical evacuations and shelter in
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Figure 5
Hospital Preparedness Program and Public Health
Emergency Preparedness Funding, FY 2002–2008 [$ millions]
Millions

$915

$900

$870

$850

$766

$800
$700

$897

$863

$705

Public Health Emergency
Preparedness (includes CRI)

$600

$515

$516

$500

$491

$450

$415

$400

$398

Hospital
Preparedness
Program

$300
$200
$100
$0

$135
|
FY 2002

|
FY 2003

|
FY 2004

|
FY 2005

|
FY 2006

|
FY 2007

|
FY 2008

Source: Health Research Institute (HRI), Closing the Seams: Developing an Integrated Approach
to Health System Disaster Preparedness, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007; and HHS, Public Health
Emergency Preparedness guidance, May 29, 2008, p. 24, and Hospital Preparedness Program Cooperative Agreement guidance, 2008, p. 22.

place protocols, and developing partnerships and coalitions. Past priority areas that grantees can continue to enhance after priority funding
areas are addressed include developing alternate care sites, securing
mobile medical assets, building pharmaceutical caches, purchasing
protective personal equipment, developing decontamination capacity,
and protecting critical infrastructure. (See Figure 5.)
QQ

PHEP provides funds to state health departments to build public health
preparedness capabilities at both the state and local level. Administered by the CDC, the PHEP is largely used to support public sector,
population-based preparedness functions (such as disease surveillance
systems), rather than private sector medical response capacity. However, public health agencies utilize PHEP funds to improve their own
emergency medical management and response capabilities, to plan and
conduct mass prophylaxis (such as the mass distribution of antibiotics to
counter aerosolized anthrax), and to more broadly support the receipt
and distribution of the SNS.18 While these types of countermeasure
distribution activities are likely to be conducted in concert with private
health care providers, PHEP funds are not typically redistributed to
community-based health care organizations.
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QQ

MMRS provides funding to 124 urban jurisdictions to help prepare for

mass casualty events. Created within HHS in 1996 following the Sarin
nerve agent gas attack in Tokyo and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,19 the MMRS officially became
part of DHS in 2003.20 Most jurisdictions have focused these funds on
the needs of first responders, such as fire and rescue personnel, emergency medical technicians, and emergency management agencies,
rather than hospitals, physician organizations, or other clinical sites.
However, local jurisdictions receiving MMRS funds have a significant
degree of flexibility in how they utilize these resources, and variability
across grantees exists.

These core preparedness assistance programs have been augmented by a
number of smaller, more targeted capacity building efforts. For example
the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI), which is incorporated into PHEP
funds, was initiated in 2004 to improve the efficiency of major metropolitan
areas in delivering SNS medicines and medical supplies within 48 hours
during a large-scale public health emergency.21 Initially, 21 cities had been
selected to receive direct funding and assistance. By 2006, the initiative
had expanded to include 72 metropolitan areas, with at least one funded
city in every state. Approximately $64.2 million were allocated to the CRI
in FY 2008.
Targeted federal funds have also been focused on helping state and local
governments mobilize volunteer health care providers in the event of a
disaster. The Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer
Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) assists states in registering health professionals willing to serve as volunteers in order to expedite confirmation of
credentials, licensing, accreditation status, and hospital privileges should a
disaster occur. Administered as part of the HPP, successful implementation
of an ESAR-VHP is a condition of the HPP grant award. In FY 2008 $3.9
million were allocated to ESAR-VHP. HHS also provides a modest level of
funds directly to local communities through the Medical Reserve Corps
(MRC) to aid in the recruitment and training of health care volunteers. (For
more details on the ESAR-VHP and MRC programs, see Appendix.)
Technical assistance provided through these various funding programs
is enhanced by research and development activities intended to inform
and facilitate the management of disaster medical response. The Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) has played an important
role in developing guidance and tools that can assist states, localities, and
health care organizations in improving medical preparedness. For example,
AHRQ published a guide to help community planners address the range
of logistical, legal, and ethical challenges inherent in providing mass
medical care with scarce resources,22 convened an expert panel to develop
recommendations for the use of altered standards of care during mass
casualty events,23 and developed a tool that hospitals can use to evaluate
disaster drills.24 AHRQ has also supported the development of the National
Hospital Available Beds for Emergencies and Disasters System (HAvBED),
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an electronic tracking system to monitor inpatient bed availability which
includes standardized definitions for types of beds (such medical-surgical,
pediatric, critical care, psychiatric, and burn beds).25 In addition to these
tools and guidelines, AHRQ has also supported the creation of a variety
of continuing education training modules to build the preparedness skills
of health care professionals.
The CDC has supported complementary health services research activities related to disaster medical response. For example, CDC convened
an expert panel to explore the surge capacity needs generated by terrorist events using conventional weapons. The panel highlighted critical
resource constraints related to imaging and blood bank services.26 The
agency also developed FluSurge, a modeling software program for the
prediction of surge capacity needs related to an influenza pandemic based
on a range of variables including disease incidence, morbidity, severity,
and transmission rates. CDC also created an interactive self-study training module to provide clinical education pertinent to a radiological or
nuclear terrorism incident.
OASPR has released playbooks for 2 of the 15 scenarios identified in the
National Preparedness Guidelines (hurricanes and aerosolized anthrax)
and is close to completing several others. These playbooks provide a strategic overview of the key decisions points, actions, capabilities, and assets
that could be initiated in the provision of federal assistance. Working with
the HHS Office of Disability, OASPR has also developed a training toolkit
to help emergency managers better anticipate and address the needs of
at-risk populations in their preparedness planning.
[For a comprehensive inventory of federal guidance and technical assistance
published for state use in preparing for medical surge, please see Appendix
III, Table 3 in the recent report by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), “Emergency Preparedness: States Are Planning for Medical Surge,
but Could Benefit from Shared Guidance for Allocating Scarce Medical Resources,” GAO-08-668, June 2008 (www.gao.gov/new.items/d08668.pdf).]

opportunities for improvement
These federal initiatives, together with preparedness efforts undertaken by
states, localities, and private sector organizations, have improved disaster
medical response capabilities over the last several years, but gaps remain.
A variety of deficiencies persist and experts believe that the amount of
progress made varies significantly across jurisdictions.27 Although numerous studies and expert panels have raised concerns about the adequacy of
medical preparedness, efforts to both evaluate incremental improvements
and gauge the magnitude of jurisdictional differences are limited by the
nascent nature of performance standards.28
Developing meaningful performance measures for medical preparedness is challenging, in part, because preparedness planning depends on
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establishing new and largely untested types of functional relationships.
Interdependency is necessary for achieving preparedness goals, but it
also leads to a diffusion of responsibility and ambiguity regarding the
appropriate “unit of analysis” for evaluative studies. Although individual
organizations each have responsibility for contributing to medical preparedness and response, these capacities and capabilities ultimately rely
on collective action. The following narrative describes attempts to refine
performance expectations for key players in disaster medical response
and highlights concerns that have been raised regarding the need for
further improvement.

Hospitals: Divided They Fall
For a variety of reasons, hospitals have typically served as the focal point
of discussions about medical preparedness. Hospitals have historically
served as a hub of community medical resources; most are not-for-profit
organizations with legally binding community benefit obligations29 that include
Hospitals are undoubtedly key players in disasemergency services; hospitals maintain
ter medical response, but their effectiveness
ongoing relationships with a variety
hinges on integrating their individual plans
of health professionals through both
with community-wide efforts.
employment contracts and medical staff
privileges; and the public has traditionally viewed hospital emergency departments as the place to go in the
event of a life threatening injury or illness. Hospitals are undoubtedly key
players in disaster medical response, but their effectiveness often hinges
on how well the disaster plans of individual hospitals are integrated into
robust community-wide and regional planning efforts.
The Joint Commission has revised its emergency management standards
for hospitals over the last several years and continues to explore additional
changes in order to encourage collaboration across institutions and with
other community assets. Prior to 2001, Joint Commission standards assumed that hospitals implementing plans would be operating within the
context of an intact community and did not clearly acknowledge the need
to coordinate with external planning efforts. In revising these standards in
January 2001, the Joint Commission began requiring hospitals to (i) integrate hospital-based planning efforts with community-wide coordination
of resources, (ii) complete a hazard vulnerability analysis, (iii) involve hospital leaders in disaster planning, (iv) utilize an all-hazards approach, and
(v) address mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery goals in their
plans. In order to fully implement these standards, the Joint Commission
explored the experience of hospitals in communities that had previously
encountered some type of disaster, either natural or man-made.
The Joint Commission determined that the hospitals that performed best
under emergency conditions were those that had planned most carefully concerning logistical issues.30 Most frequently, these hospitals were
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members of larger hospital networks and able to rely on the broader system
for supplies (such as large generators, fuel, food, water, staff, and medications). In one example, a disaster-affected community lost power for one
week and the community hospital required 85,000 gallons of fuel to run the
hospital’s power generators. Nearly 90 percent of this fuel was supplied by
the network’s headquarters, located 500 miles away from the affected community; only 10 percent was provided through public sector assistance.
Numerous studies and expert panel recommendations have echoed
the importance of developing collaborative disaster management plans
that rely on regional coordination and asset sharing.31 Unfortunately,
the Joint Commission determined that few hospitals had the benefit
of strong community-wide planning that could serve as a foundation
for individual facility plans. The competitive tensions inherent in dayto-day operations can often undermine cooperative disaster planning
across health care organizations in the absence of strong public sector
leadership. Hospitals that are not part of a broader system face particular
challenges in developing regional relationships through memoranda of
understanding (MOUs) and other formal agreements for mutual aid.
While network-based hospitals have some advantages in arranging
“intra-system” cooperation and coordination, working with unaffiliated hospitals and non-hospital resources can pose challenges similar
to those faced by independent institutions.
Routine capacity constraints in hospital emergency department (ED) capacity may further compound market-based disincentives to collaborative
planning. Medical response to a disaster would likely mobilize resources
well beyond the ED. However, the individuals poised to take on leadership roles in preparedness planning and response functions are often ED
managers and clinical staff with specialized expertise in patient triage
and trauma care. EDs are struggling to meet daily surge demands, and
crowding is widespread.32 This daily pressure limits the time, attention,
and resources that ED personnel can devote to disaster planning efforts
and undermines cooperation across health care organizations. Similar
constraints in staff capacity in nursing and other professional disciplines
utilized by health care organizations limit the availability of personnel to
train for public health emergencies.
The hospital industry has argued that insufficient resources are available
to support preparedness efforts. The Center for Biosecurity estimates that
the minimum costs of developing and maintaining pandemic influenza
surge capacity for an average size hospital are close to a $1 million one-time
investment with additional $200,000 annually in maintenance expenses.33
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Health Research Institute (HRI) calculates that
the HPP provided an average of roughly $82,500 per hospital nationally in
2007,34 and reports that some hospitals have not applied for funding because
the financial demands of grant requirements significantly exceed funding
levels.35 The actual amount of HPP funding distributed to individual facilities varies considerably. Less than half of all hospitals receive any HPP
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funds, as some states restrict funding to “lead” institutions.36 Despite this
variation, an HRI survey of hospital managers, state and local officials, and
health care professionals found that 83 percent of respondents believed
that preparedness funding was insufficient, and over one-third reported
major unmet planning needs due to funding constraints.37
The hospital industry has suggested that additional public funds should
be made available to support preparedness, but others contend that
not-for-profit hospitals are obligated to make
these investments themselves in light of the
The financial condition of hospitals and
preferential tax status they enjoy as charitable
organizations. The Internal Revenue Service
their ability and willingness to absorb
(IRS) established the community benefit stanthe costs of preparedness planning varies
dard that currently guides determinations of
significantly across institutions.
charitable intent in 1969. IRS ruling 69-545 suggests that tax-exempt hospitals should provide
emergency care to all persons requiring such services regardless of their
ability to pay. While disaster planning is a recognized communitybuilding activity for hospitals that supports broadly defined community
benefit obligations, federal tax law does not explicitly require tax-exempt
hospitals to engage in such activities.
The financial condition of hospitals and their ability and willingness
to absorb the costs of preparedness planning vary significantly across
institutions. HRI highlighted the low margins of the public hospitals in
which trauma centers and burn centers are frequently housed. Echoing
these concerns, a recent hearing by the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform explored the potential impact of proposed
reductions in Medicaid payments on hospital preparedness efforts.38
While not all hospitals are financially vulnerable, a study by the Center
for Studying Health System Change suggests that most hospitals in the
sentinel markets studied rely heavily on federal funds to support their
disaster planning activities.39

Government Role in Planning and Response
State and local government officials recognize the need for a more coordinated approach to disaster medical planning, but face challenges
in orchestrating private sector efforts. Government regulators are often
uncertain about how to constructively increase performance expectations
for hospitals and other health care organizations.
Public sector efforts to coordinate regional approaches to medical
preparedness are critically important. As stated previously, many key
decisions related to preparedness development such as triage protocols,
altered standards of care; interoperable standards for communications,
equipment, and training; and patient transfer plans cannot be made by
individual hospitals acting in isolation. The lack of dedicated preparedness
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planning staff in public health agencies and hospitals has been cited as
an important barrier to the development of regional disaster medical
response plans.40
States have pursued a variety of different strategies to develop disaster
medical preparedness. Both the level of state leadership exhibited to guide
and coordinate planning efforts and the mechanisms used to redistribute
federal grant funds across provider organizations have varied substantially
from state to state.
The state of California has been at the forefront of the development of
disaster medical response capacity. California has made major investments in preparedness development beyond the federal grant dollars
it has received and was the first state to release detailed standards and
guidance for health care surge during emergencies.41 The guidance clearly
acknowledges that the delivery of care during a disaster will differ from
routine practices, identifies the legal and administrative mechanisms to
support this shift, and clarifies the anticipated roles of hospitals, government-authorized alternate care sites, clinics, long-term care facilities, and
other non-hospital providers. Similar efforts are under way elsewhere, but
some states have been less proactive in facilitating hospital preparedness
planning and coordinating state and regional collaboration.
Federal officials are seeking to clarify expectations and strengthen performance objectives for states in order to stimulate a more coordinated
approach to planning. These performance objectives have shifted over
time, evolving from structural measures (such as personnel added, equipment acquired, and plans developed) to process measures that seek to
assess program capabilities. These revised expectations include requirements related to compliance with National Incident Management System
(NIMS) principles, education and training standards, evaluation of drills
and exercises, and attention to the needs of at-risk populations. Although
some disconnects between PHEP and HPP measures continue, goals for
these complementary programs have become more tightly integrated over
time with increased cross-references to each other’s objectives.
Grantees have also been charged with meeting increasingly specific,
quantifiable measures of performance. Performance measures for the
FY 2008 HPP grants are summarized in the text box (see next page). FY
2009 awards will be contingent on achieving these objectives. A recent
report by the GAO suggests that most states are well positioned to meet
performance objectives related to bed tracking and the electronic registration of volunteers.42 Yet, in light of heightened performance expectations,
state officials are calling for more support from the federal government
not only in terms of funding, but also in the development of more explicit, detailed policy guidance and improved operational assistance for
disaster response.
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Performance Measures for the FY 2008 HPP Grants
Performance measures for the FY 2008 HPP grants are summarized
below. FY 2009 awards will be contingent on achieving these objectives. A recent report by the GAO suggests that most states are well
positioned to meet performance objectives related to bed tracking
and the electronic registration of volunteers.

Measures
State can report available beds for at least 75 percent of participating hospitals according to HAvBED definitions.
State can query their ESAR-VHP system during a functional
drill, exercise, or actual event to generate a list of potential volunteer health professionals, by discipline and credential level, within
2 hours or less of a request
State can compile an initial list of volunteer health professionals by discipline and credential level, within 12 hours or less
of a request and report a verified list of available volunteers within
24 hours of a request.
State conducts statewide and regional exercises including
hospitals that incorporate NIMS concepts and principles.
Proportion of participating hospitals that...
OO

OO

OO

Can report available beds according to HAvBED definitions
within 60 minutes of a request.
Demonstrate dedicated, redundant communications capability during an exercise or incident as evidenced by evaluations or after-action reports.
Demonstrate sustained two-way communications capability with the local Disaster Operations Command and other
health coalition partners during an exercise or incident.

OO

Have written plans to address mass fatalities.

OO

Have written plans to address medical evacuation.

OO

Incorporate NIMS concepts and principles

OO

Have identified appropriate personnel for training and verified their completion of required courses.
Source: Federal Register, 73, no. 96 (May 16,
2008): pp. 28472–28478.
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Funding levels — Health care executives and state and local government

officials have been vocal in raising concerns that federal funding levels
have diminished as performance requirements have grown. Funding
available through the HPP cooperative agreement has decreased by over
20 percent since 2003. The President’s proposed 2009 budget calls for an
additional decrease of $60 million, consistent with a number of other
proposed reductions in assistance to states and localities for homeland
security preparedness.43 After the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan was released in July 2007, experts and local
officials were sharply critical of the plan’s failure to
Federal officials have maintained that
adequately address the financial needs of the health
44
care system in providing care to the sick.
public health and medical prepared-

ness is primarily a function
Federal officials have maintained that public health
and medical preparedness is primarily a function of
and local government.
state and local government as defined in our nation’s
constitutional framework and stress that significant federal resources have
been invested to help states fulfill their responsibilities. HHS published a
proposal in the Federal Register in May 2008 to require recipients of the HPP
cooperative agreement to contribute matching funds in an amount equal
to 5 percent of their award beginning in 2009.45 For 2010 and subsequent
years, a 10 percent match is proposed.

of state

Policymakers have also considered the need for a risk-based allocation
of preparedness dollars. Some have argued that the mechanism used to
distribute HPP funds across states should incorporate a more meaningful assessment of the risk of a major medical emergency within a given
jurisdiction, including the risk of natural disasters and intentional acts of
terrorism. Others argue that some risks, such as the threat of influenza
pandemic, are pervasive and attempts to define relative risk across jurisdictions would be highly subjective and difficult to defend.
Policy guidance and technical assistance — Although critiques of federal

leadership are often framed around perceptions of funding insufficiency,
these concerns have also been more broadly articulated to include a call for
more explicit guidance on the difficult decisions raised by disaster medical
response. Disaster response will require difficult decisions regarding the
allocation of scarce resources and alteration of care standards. Although
some states and localities have begun to tackle many of these thorny issues,
many would welcome the protection and standardization that national
guidelines would confer. A recent report by the GAO noted that only 7 of
the 20 states sampled have made progress in defining altered standards
of care during a mass casualty event.46 Some states indicated that federal
efforts to convene medical, public health, and legal experts to address these
complex issues would be helpful.

A public-private Task Force for Mass Critical Care recently released guidance for the allocation of scarce resources during a mass casualty event.47
The guidance establishes a clinically based algorithm on which triage
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and resource allocation decisions could rest to ensure uniformity across
provider organizations. Experts have noted the confusion and animosity
that could arise if jurisdictions apply disparate assumptions and priorities in rationing care or altering quality standards. While the Task Force’s
guidance provides organizational models for the implementation and
oversight of triage protocols, the need for further government action was
highlighted. The Task Force encouraged policymakers to endorse a clearly
defined algorithm process and to develop mechanisms for monitoring
compliance during a mass casualty event.
Some have also called for the federal government to take a more active
role in brokering cooperation and assistance among states. A number of
metropolitan areas have already begun to establish inter-state regional
partnerships, but additional federal support might enhance the spread
and strength of these medical compacts. The $18.1 million award made
by HHS to 11 emergency medical partnership collaboratives in September
2007 has been hailed as a positive step in building regionalized medical
response capacity. However, the decision to fund these Healthcare Facility
Partnerships through a reduction in HPP cooperative agreement dollars
has added to discontent over funding adequacy.
State and local officials have sought more federal support for peer-to-peer
learning across states. Many jurisdictions are tackling similar challenges
(such as integrating various volunteer resources like the MRC and the
American Red Cross, recruiting and training emergency management
personnel, and developing interoperable communications systems). Federal
efforts to broker consensus on best practices are often viewed as lacking.
A need for increased federal engagement in resolving legal and operational
conflicts across states has also been noted. For example, some believe that
increased federal involvement could help to resolve a range of issues that
hamper inter-state sharing of personnel (such as those related to reciprocal recognition of professional licensure and credentialing, workers’
compensation coverage, and malpractice liability protections). Similarly
inter-state differences regarding Medicaid coverage and payment for displaced persons have been cited as creating administrative hurdles that
could benefit from federal intervention.
States have also sought more explicit policies regarding the suspension
or relaxation of federal requirements concerning the provision of health
care services during a disaster. Section 319 of the Public Health Service
Act gives the Secretary of HHS broad authority to determine that a public health disaster exists and also confers power to waive or streamline
a range of administrative and certain statutory requirements when a
Presidential declaration of emergency or disaster has been made.48 Authority exists for the waiver of some requirements, such as Conditions
of Participation for Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP); certain provisions of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA); and the Health Insurance
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Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). However, the circumstances
necessary to trigger such a waiver are unspecified. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recently waived certain documentation
requirements for providers in flood-stricken areas of Iowa and Indiana.
The limited application of these waivers to date, including those related
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, make it difficult to interpret the extent to
which Medicare is prepared to accommodate significant alteration of care
standards and other regulatory standards under catastrophic conditions.
Clearer processes and parameters related to petitioning for, and granting of, emergency federal waivers could further expedite state efforts to
develop pragmatic approaches to medical preparedness.
Operational assistance — Calls to strengthen the federal role in medical
response during a disaster have generally focused on improving the nature,
rather than expanding the scale, of federal assistance. Although some have
argued that the capacity of federal response assets should be increased,
most recognize that the federal government is unlikely to develop a significant level of reserve medical capacity that could be leveraged in the
event of a disaster. More concerns have been raised about the capabilities
of federal response resources currently availMost recognize that the federal governable, as well as the ability to integrate these
resources into local response efforts.
ment is unlikely to develop a significant

level of reserve medical capacity that could
Medical response to Hurricane Katrina revealed numerous problems in capabilities
be leveraged in the event of a disaster.
at the local, state, and federal levels. Federal
officials have taken a variety of steps to resolve deficiencies in federal assistance as required by both administrative and legislative directives. A
clear and overarching weakness in federal medical response to Katrina
stemmed from ambiguity and miscommunication within the federal chain
of command. In response to this issue, the PAHPA authorized the transfer
of NDMS from DHS back to HHS, consolidated a number of medical response responsibilities under the OASPR, and mandated a comprehensive
review of NDMS management and implementation.
Although federal personnel provided valuable medical assistance in the
Gulf Coast area following Hurricane Katrina, numerous problems were
encountered.49 Travel difficulties delayed the arrival of both NDMS teams
and equipment and, once in place, teams had trouble coordinating with
local emergency management and with HHS, which was responsible for
managing federal medical assets. NDMS staffing models were geared
toward the provision of trauma care while patient needs were often characterized by lapsed chronic disease management and mental health crises.
Military medical evacuation capacity was limited and not well configured
to short-haul transportation needs. PHS Commissioned Corps staff was
insufficiently prepared to deploy and serve in a response capacity.
The ongoing review of NDMS is likely to identify the need for additional changes, but steps have already been taken to address some of the
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shortcomings observed in the Katrina response. The President’s FY 2009
budget requested a $7 million increase in NDMS funding to enhance regional coordination efforts, improve training, bolster logistical support,
and complete implementation of an electronic patient medical record that
was pilot tested during the California wildfires in 2007.
A recent GAO investigation found that DHS and HHS have successfully
collaborated with states to more clearly delineate the federal role in patient
evacuation from health facilities, although additional clarity is needed to
address evacuation of nursing home residents.50 Consolidation of authorities under OASPR have been beneficial,
Some federal responsibilities remain ambigubut some ambiguities in federal responsibilities remain, including those related
ous, including those related to intersections
to intersections between medical and
between medical and mass care functions (such
mass care functions (such as sheltering
as sheltering disaster victims).
disaster victims).
Enhancements to PHS Commissioned Corps capabilities have also been
proposed. The President’s FY 2009 budget includes a $26 million increase
to support the transformation of Commissioned Corps capabilities, including expanded recruitment and training, as well as the development of two
dedicated Health and Medical Response (HAMR) teams. Each team will be
designed for rapid deployment (within 12 hours) and will be composed of
105 highly trained, dedicated staff members who will not have concurrent
responsibilities for staffing other PHS activities.
Deployment of SNS resources in the Gulf Coast region following Katrina
was generally viewed as successful, although some problems were noted.
Federal investigators determined that more SNS supplies should have been
placed in the region before the hurricane made landfall, given the advance
warning provided by storm tracking data. Concerns were also raised that
inventories of pre-packaged SNS supplies were overly oriented toward
biological threats and therefore some supplies went unused. In contrast,
supplies for chronic care medications, such as antihypertensive and psychotropic drugs, were in short supply. Some experts have cautioned that
the content of the SNS should be adjusted to better address pediatric needs
as required by PAHPA. Some also believe that stockpile request procedures
should be revised to minimize the potential for inter-state competition for
resources. The CRI effort has markedly improved most participating cities’
ability to distribute SNS supplies, but some jurisdictions are still working
to fully establish this capacity.
State and local officials are encouraged by developments to improve federal response assistance, but many harbor lingering concerns about the
reliability and utility of federal medical assets. Some have suggested that
more drills and exercises need to include federal participants in order to
provide valid assessments of preparedness levels. State and local stakeholders hope the OASPR playbooks are part of a continuing evolution toward
improved interoperability and effective partnership.
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Conclusion
The willingness of federal, state, local, and private planners to confront the
realities of a potential public health emergency, acknowledge weaknesses
in the existing infrastructure, and adapt to the challenges of catastrophic
medical response is both necessary and remarkable. It is human nature to
avoid difficult decisions, particularly those that do not demand immediate
action. Overcoming this inertia involves complex economic, political, and
ethical challenges. Yet across the country, significant progress is being
made to develop a more realistic, integrative approach to preparedness
planning. These efforts will require ongoing support, policy oversight,
and leadership to address the pitfalls that are sure to arise, mediate conflicting priorities, and galvanize tenuous links in the chain of disaster
response capabilities.
Federal policymakers are being called on to play an even more proactive
role in addressing these “weak links.” Unresolved concerns regarding the
structure, priorities, and utility of federal medical response assets have
been identified. The adequacy of existing funding levels, the suitability of
performance expectations, and the rigor of accountability mechanisms for
both states and providers have been questioned. Furthermore, the need
for more explicit federal law sanctioning acceptable approaches to altered
medical practices during disaster response has been raised. Planning for
the dire circumstances posed by disaster scenarios exposes many of the
unseen fissures and unspoken compromises inherent in the health care
system. Preparing for these demanding contingencies, particularly in the
face of day-to-day pressures, will require ongoing public-private collaboration and cooperation across all levels of government.
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Appendix
Descriptions of
Select Federal
Disaster Medical
Assistance Programs

Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)
The SNS is a repository of medications, equipment, and supplies, such as antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antiviral agents, antitoxins, and airway maintenance
supplies. The SNS is designed to supplement and resupply jurisdictions at the request
of the Governor(s) of the affected state(s). The SNS is administered by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and includes two major components:
• Push-Packs — A relatively small proportion of the total SNS inventory is prepackaged in push-packs which are designed to be delivered within 12 hours of a
federal decision to deploy. These push packs are maintained by HHS at regional caches
in undisclosed locations. Upon arrival at a designated receiving and storage site, SNS
assets are transferred to state and local authorities for breakdown and distribution.
• Specific Material Support — The bulk of the SNS stockpile is maintained through
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) and inventory managed directly by the CDC.
These inventories can make a wider, more flexible range of supplies available to
affected communities within 24 to 36 hours. CDC contracts with a select group of
vendors to maintain inventories of defined supplies and medications which can be
called upon if initial push-pack supplies are exhausted or if specialized supplies
not included in the push packs are needed. Because specialized resources (such as
anthrax and smallpox vaccines, antitoxins, and ventilators) are not included in the
push packs, these specialized resources may serve as the initial response from the
SNS program depending on the nature of the incident.
Procurement of some specialized medical countermeasures included within the SNS,
such as anthrax and smallpox vaccines, has been funded through the Project Bioshield
special reserve fund. This $5.6 billion fund was established in the FY 2004 Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act and is administered by the Biomedical
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (OASPR). Approximately $1.8 billion
was drawn from the Project Bioshield fund between July 2004 and July 2006.*

National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
NDMS was formed in 1984 in order to provide medical evacuation and care to
military and civilian casualties returning from overseas wars.† Never deployed
for its original purpose, the NDMS has since evolved to provide civilian support to
communities experiencing major disasters. Originally housed in the U.S. Public Health
Service within HHS, the program was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, and transferred back to HHS in 2007. NDMS is now coordinated
by the OASPR and has three distinct components:
• Response teams can be deployed to disaster sites to provide emergency triage
and care. Several types of teams are designed to respond to specific needs (see
sidebar). Teams are mobilized within 6 hours of notification, are capable of arriving on-site within 48 hours, come with equipment, supplies, and logistical support
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to sustain medical operations
without external support for 72
hours, and are designed to remain
deployed for two-week periods.
The federal government is in the
process of developing Federal
Medical Stations (through the SNS
program), which will further support response team functionality
by providing deployable medical
facilities complete with equipment, supplies, and a limited
inventory of pharmaceuticals.
Although designed to be selfsustaining, NDMS response teams
are intended to supplement local
and state response assets at the
direction of the local incident
commander. While deployed,
team members are paid as parttime federal employees and are
protected from malpractice claims
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Although team members become
federalized once deployed, most
serve as practicing civilian health
care providers in their home
communities when not activated
under NDMS.

Types of NDMS Response Teams
A Disaster Medical Assistance Team
(DMAT) is designed to provide general
medical assistance. Approximately 55
regionally organized DMATs are in
place across the country. Each team
includes about 35 health care professionals including physicians, nurses,
medical technicians, as well as additional logistics and support staff. If
teams are providing care to patients
requiring treatment comparable to the
type delivered in inpatient settings, all
the DMATs working together could
serve about 1,400 patients per day.
A National Medical Response Team
(NMRT) is designed to provide medical
care following a nuclear, biological, or
chemical incident and has specialized
expertise in mass casualty decontamination, medical triage, and care provision in a hazardous material environment. Each team typically consists of
50 staff members, and four teams are
in place nationwide.
Approximately 21 Specialty Care
Teams are organized to provide specific
types of response capabilities including burn teams, pediatric DMATs, and
mental health teams.

• Patient Evacuation includes
communication and medical
A Disaster Mortuary Operational
transportation of disaster vicResponse Team (DMORT) provides
tims from identified mobilizaassistance in identifying and processtion centers to NDMS treatment
ing deceased victims. Eleven DMORTs
facilities in unaffected areas by
have been established nationwide.
Department of Defense aircraft
and vehicles. Transportation of
patients from the disaster site to the mobilization centers or to local care sites
is considered a responsibility of state and local authorities.
• Definitive Hospital Care provides for inpatient medical treatment beyond emergency stabilization. Approximately 2,000 hospitals, including
private, Veterans Administration, and Department of Defense facilities,
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participate in NDMS and have offered roughly 1,000 patient care beds for
definitive care through the system.‡ Hospitals participating in NDMS do not
receive financial support for entering into this commitment, but are eligible
for compensation for services rendered through the NDMS during emergency response at a rate equal to 110 percent of Medicare’s payment rates.

Public Health Service (PHS) Commissioned Corps Teams
The teams include approximately 6,000 public health professionals trained in
clinical disciplines and other related fields, such as engineering. Commissioned
Corps officers serve in managerial and clinical positions throughout HHS. Although the Corps was not designed as a deployable medical response asset, select
Commissioned Corps personnel with relevant skills have been organized into five
Rapid Deployment Teams each with a 105 multidisciplinary staff complement.§
Teams serve on a rotating call basis, and on-call teams are available to support
states and localities within 12 hours of notification. A specialized Mental Health
Team and an Applied Public Health Team have also been established with the
Commissioned Corps.

Emergency System for Advance Registration of
Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP)
The ESAR-VHP program assists states in registering health professionals
willing to serve as volunteers in order to expedite confirmation of credentials,
licensing, accreditation status, and hospital privileges should a disaster occur.
Administered as part of the HPP, successful implementation on an ESAR-VHP
is a condition of the HPP grant award. In FY 2008, $3.9 million were allocated
to ESAR-VHP. States have some flexibility in structuring their system, but these
designs must be consistent with HHS guidelines. The Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) requires that state-based ESAR-VHP systems be linked
through a national database to allow for inter-state verification of volunteer credentials. A number of states have integrated the registry of health professionals
with broader efforts to proactively identify and certify emergency volunteers from
a variety of nonmedical service sectors.

Medical Reserve Corps (MRC)
The Office of the Surgeon General within HHS began implementing the MRC
in March 2002 as part of the White House’s USA Freedom Corps Initiative. In
FY 2008 the MRC program provided $9.6 million in grant funds to communities
across the country to help organize and utilize volunteers (such as physicians,
nurses, pharmacists, and others) to provide and support medical services. These
APPENDIX – continued

National Health Policy Forum | www.nhpf.org

>

29

Background Paper – No. 65
August 8, 2008

Descriptions of Select
Federal Disaster Medical
Assistance Program

APPENDIX > Medical Reserve Corps

services can be provided in response to public health emergencies, as well as
on a routine basis to promote population health. As of January 2008, over 720
MRC units have been established with almost 150,000 volunteers. Although the
majority of these units receive federal grant awards ($5,000 to $10,000 per unit),
some communities have established MRC units without receiving direct federal
funds to do so.
MRC units are organized locally to meet the needs in their community. Unlike
the medical response teams organized under NDMS, the structures of MRC units
are not standardized, team members are not compensated for services provided
during disaster response, and training requirements are less prescriptive. While
MRC units are primarily intended to support disaster response in the locality in
which they are organized, the PAHPA authorized deployment capacity which
is currently being developed. MRC units receive funding through a cooperative
agreement established with the National Association of County and City Health
Officials, which also provides technical and logistical support for the units. MRC
volunteers can be incorporated into the ESAR-VHP registry, but states report
problems in coordinating these programs.¶

Appendix Endnotes
*		Office of Public Health Disaster Medical Countermeasures, Project Bioshield, Annual Report to
Congress: July 2004 through July 2006, Office of Public Health Disaster Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), July 31, 2006; available at www.hhs.gov/aspr/barda/
documents/bioshieldannualreport.pdf.
†		Crystal Franco et al., “The National Disaster Medical System: Past, Present, and Suggestions for the
Future,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 5, no. 4 (2007): p. 320.
‡		Franco et al., “The National Disaster Medical System,” p. 321.
§		HHS, “Federal Public Health and Medical Assistance”; available at www.hhs.gov/disasters/
discussion/planners/medicalassistance.html#usp#usp.
¶		U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Emergency Preparedness: States Are Planning
for Medical Surge, but Could Benefit from Shared Guidance for Allocating Scarce Medical Resources,” GAO-08-668, June 2008, p. 26; available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d08668.pdf.
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